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Abstract: Deep Neural Network-based systems are now the state-of-the-art in
many robotics tasks, but their application in safety-critical domains remains dan-
gerous without formal guarantees on network robustness. Small perturbations to
sensor inputs (from noise or adversarial examples) are often enough to change
network-based decisions, which was already shown to cause an autonomous ve-
hicle to swerve into oncoming traffic. In light of these dangers, numerous al-
gorithms have been developed as defensive mechanisms from these adversarial
inputs, some of which provide formal robustness guarantees or certificates. This
work leverages research on certified adversarial robustness to develop an online
certified defense for deep reinforcement learning algorithms. The proposed de-
fense computes guaranteed lower bounds on state-action values during execution
to identify and choose the optimal action under a worst-case deviation in input
space due to possible adversaries or noise. The approach is demonstrated on a
Deep Q-Network policy and is shown to increase robustness to noise and adver-
saries in pedestrian collision avoidance scenarios and a classic control task.
Keywords: Adversarial Attacks, Reinforcement Learning, Collision Avoidance,
Robustness Verification
1 Introduction
Deep reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms have achieved impressive success on robotic manipu-
lation [1] and robot navigation in pedestrian crowds [2, 3]. Many of these systems utilize black-box
predictions from deep neural networks (DNNs) to achieve state-of-the-art performance in predic-
tion and planning tasks. However, the lack of formal robustness guarantees for DNNs currently
limits their application in safety-critical domains, such as collision avoidance. In particular, even
subtle perturbations to the input, known as adversarial examples, can lead to incorrect (but highly-
confident) predictions from DNNs [4, 5, 6]. Furthermore, several recent works have demonstrated
the danger of adversarial examples in real-world situations [7, 8], including causing an autonomous
vehicle to swerve into oncoming traffic [9]. The work in this paper addresses the lack of robustness
against adversarial examples and sensor noise by proposing an online certified defense to add onto
existing deep RL algorithms during execution.
Existing methods to defend against adversaries, such as adversarial training [10, 11, 12, 13], defen-
sive distillation [14], or model ensembles [15] do not come with theoretical guarantees for reliably
improving the robustness and are often ineffective on the advent of more advanced adversarial at-
tacks [16, 17, 18, 19]. Verification methods do provide formal guarantees on the robustness of a given
network, but finding the guarantees is an NP-complete problem and computationally intractable to
solve in real-time for applications like robot manipulation or navigation [20, 21, 22, 23, 24]. Robust-
ness certification methods relax the problem to make it tractable. Given an adversarial distortion of
a nominal input, instead of finding exact bounds on the worst-case output deviation, these methods
efficiently find certified lower bounds [25, 26, 27]. In particular, the work by [27] runs in real-time
for small networks (33 to 14, 000 times faster than verification methods), its bound has been shown
to be within 10% error of the true bound, and it is compatible with many activation functions [28]
and neural network architectures [29]. These methods were applied on computer vision tasks.
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Figure 1: Intuition. An adversary distorts the true
position, s0, of a dynamic obstacle (blue) into
an adversarial observation, sadv . The agent (or-
ange) only sees the adversarial input, so nominal
RL policies would take a∗nom to reach the goal
quickly, but would then collide with the true ob-
stacle, s0. The proposed defensive strategy con-
siders that s0 could be anywhere inside the -ball
around sadv , and selects the action, a∗adv , with the
best, worst-case outcome as calculated by a guar-
anteed lower bound on the value network output,
which cautiously avoids the obstacle while reach-
ing the goal. Note this is different from simply in-
flating the obstacle radius, since the action values
contain information about environment dynamics,
e.g., blue agent’s cooperativeness.
This work extends the tools for robustness certifi-
cation against adversaries to deep RL tasks. As a
motivating example, consider the collision avoid-
ance setting in Fig. 1, in which an adversary per-
turbs an agent’s (orange) observation of an obstacle
(blue). An agent following a nominal/standard deep
RL policy would observe sadv and select an action,
a∗nom, that collides with the obstacle’s true position,
s0, thinking that space is unoccupied. Our proposed
approach assumes a worst-case deviation of the ob-
served input, sadv , bounded by , and takes the op-
timal action, a∗adv , under that perturbation, to safely
avoid the true obstacle. Nominal robustness certifi-
cation algorithms assume  is a scalar, which makes
sense for image inputs (all pixels have same scale,
e.g., 0−255 intensity). A key challenge in direct
application to RL tasks is that the observation vec-
tor (network input) could have elements with sub-
stantially different scales (e.g., position, angle, joint
torques) and associated measurement uncertainties,
motivating our extension with  as a vector.
This work contributes (i) the first formulation of
robustness certification deep RL problems, (ii) an
extension of existing robustness certification algo-
rithms to variable scale inputs, (iii) an optimal ac-
tion selection rule under worst-case state perturba-
tions, and (iv) demonstrations of increased robust-
ness to adversaries and sensor noise on cartpole and
a pedestrian collision avoidance simulation.
2 Related work
2.1 Varieties of adversaries in RL
RL literature proposes many approaches to achieve adversarial robustness. Domain Randomization,
also called perturbed simulation, adversarially chooses parameters that guide the physics of a simu-
lation, such as mass, center of gravity, or friction during training [30, 31]. Other work investigates
the addition of adversarially acting agents [32, 33] during training. The resulting policies are more
robust to a distribution shift in the underlying physics from simulation to real-world, e.g., dynam-
ics/kinematics. This work, in comparison, addresses adversarial threats in the observation space, not
the underlying physics [34]. For example, adversarial threats could be created by small perturbations
in a camera image, lidar pointcloud, or estimated positions/velocities of pedestrians.
2.2 Defenses to adversarial examples
Much of the existing work on robustness against adversarial attacks detects or defends against ad-
versarial examples. Adversarial training or retraining augments the training dataset with adver-
saries [10, 11, 12, 13] to increase robustness during testing (empirically). Other works increase
robustness through distilling networks [14], comparing the output of model ensembles [15], or de-
tect adversarial examples through comparing the input with a binary filtered transformation of the
input [35]. Although these approaches show impressive empirical success, they do not come with
theoretical guarantees for reliably improving the robustness against a variety of adversarial attacks
and are often ineffective against more sophisticated adversarial attacks [16, 17, 18, 19].
2.3 Formal robustness verification and certification
Verification methods provide these desired theoretical guarantees. The methods find theoretically
proven bounds on the maximum output deviation, given a bounded input perturbation [20, 21, 22].
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These methods rely on satisfiability modulo theory (SMT) [23, 20, 24], LP, or mixed-integer linear
programming (MILP) solvers [21, 22], or zonotopes [36], to propagate constraints on the input
space to the output space. The difficulty in this propagation arises through ReLU or other activation
functions, which can be nonlinear in between the upper and lower bound of the propagated input
perturbation. In fact, the problem of finding the exact verification bounds is NP-complete [20, 27]
and thus currently infeasible to be run online on a robot. A relaxed version of the verification
problem provides certified bounds on the output deviation, given an input perturbation [25, 26, 27].
Fast-Lin [27], offers the certification of CIFAR networks in tens of seconds, provable guarantees,
and the extendability to all possible activation functions [28]. This work extends Fast-Lin from
computer vision tasks to be applicable in Deep RL domains.
2.4 Safe and risk-sensitive reinforcement learning
Like this work, several Safe RL algorithms surveyed in [37] also optimize a worst-case criterion.
Those algorithms, also called risk-sensitive RL, optimize for the reward under worst-case assump-
tions of environment stochasticity, rather than optimizing for the expected reward [38, 39, 40]. The
resulting policies are more risk-sensitive, i.e., robust to stochastic deviations in the input space, e.g.,
sensor noise, but could still fail on algorithmically-crafted adversarial examples. To be fully robust
against adversaries, this work assumes a worst-case deviation of the input space inside some bounds
and takes the action with maximum expected reward. Other work in Safe RL focuses on parame-
ter/model uncertainty, e.g., uncertainty in the model for novel observations (far from training data)
in [41, 42]. Several robotics works avoid the sim-to-real transfer by learning policies online in the
real world. However, learning in the real world is slow (requires many samples) and does not come
with full safety guarantees [43, 44].
3 Background
3.1 Robustness certification
In RL problems, the state-action value Q = E[
∑T
t=0 γ
trt] expresses the expected future reward,
rt, discounted by γ, from taking an action in a given state/observation. This work aims to find the
action that maximizes state-action value under a worst-case perturbation of the observation by sensor
noise or an adversary. This section explains how to obtain the certified lower bound on the DNN-
predicted Q, given a bounded perturbation in the input space from the true state. The derivation is
based on [27], re-formulated for RL. We define the certified lower bound of the state-action value,
QL, for each discrete action, aj , as
QL(sadv, aj) := min
s∈Bp(sadv,)
Ql(s, aj), (1)
for all possible states, s, inside the -Ball around the observed input, sadv∈Rn, whereBp(sadv, ) :=
{s : ||s− sadv||p ≤ }. Ql is the certified lower bound for a given state: Ql(s, aj) ≤ Q(s, aj)∀s ∈
Bp(sadv, ),∀aj∈A, and calculated in Eq. (3). The Lp-norm bounds the input deviation that the
adversary was allowed to apply, and is defined as ||x||p = (|x1|p+...+ |xn|p)1/p for x∈Rn, p≥1.
The certification essentially passes the interval bounds [l(0), u(0)] = [sadv − , sadv + ] from the
DNN’s input layer to the output layer, where l(k) and u(k) denotes the lower and upper bound of the
preReLU-activation, z(k), in the k-th layer of an m-layer DNN. The difficulty while passing these
bounds from layer to layer arises through the nonlinear activation functions, such as ReLU, PReLU,
tanh, sigmoid. Note that although this work considers ReLU activations, it can easily be extended
to general activation functions via the certification process as seen in [28]. When passing interval
bounds through a ReLU activation, the upper and lower preReLU bound can either both positive
(l(k), u(k) > 0), negative (l(k), u(k) < 0), or positive and negative (l(k) < 0, u(k) > 0), in which
the ReLU status is called active, inactive or undecided, respectively. In the active and inactive case,
bounds are passed to the next layer as normal. In the undecided case, the output of the ReLU is
bounded through linear upper and lower bounds:
σ[l(k),u(k)](z
(k)) =

[z(k), z(k)] if l(k), u(k) > 0, “active”
[0, 0] if l(k), u(k) < 0, “inactive”
[ u
(k)
u(k)−l(k) z
(k), u
(k)
u(k)−l(k) (z
(k) − l(k))] if l(k)<0, u(k)>0, “undecided”.
(2)
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DQN
Q(sadv, a)
Certified Defense
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Figure 2: System Architecture. During online execution, an agent observes a state, sadv , corrupted by sensor
noise or an adversarial attack. A Deep RL algorithm, e.g., Deep Q-Network (DQN) [46], predicts the state-
action values, Q. A node for certified defense accesses the predicting network, adds a robustness threshold ±
in the input space and computes a lower bound of the state-action values of each discrete action: QL. The agent
takes the action, a∗, that maximizes the lower bound, i.e. is the most robust to the deviation in the input space.
The identity matrix D is introduced as the ReLU status matrix, H as the lower/upper bounding
factor, W as the weight matrix, b as the bias in layer (k) with r, j as indices, and the preReLU-
activation, z(k), is replaced with W (k)r,: s+ b
(k)
r . The ReLU bounding is then rewritten as
D(k)r,r (W
(k)
r,j sj + b
(k)
r ) ≤ σ(W (k)r,j sj + b(k)r ) ≤ D(k)r,r (W (k)r,j sj + b(k)r −H(k)r,j ),
where D(k)r,r =

u(k)r
u
(k)
r −l(k)r
if l(k)r <0, u
(k)
r >0;
1 if l(k)r , u
(k)
r >0;
0 if l(k)r , u
(k)
r <0,
and H(k)r,j =
{
l
(k)
r if l
(k)
r <0, u
(k)
r >0, A
(k)
j,r<0;
0 otherwise.
Similar to the closed-form forward pass in a DNN, one can formulate the closed form solution for
the guaranteed lower bound of the state-action value for a single state s:
Ql(s, aj) = A
(0)
j,: s+ b
(m)
j +
m−1∑
k=1
A
(k)
j,: (b
(k) −H(k):,j ), (3)
where the matrix A contains the network weights and ReLU activation, recursively for all layers:
A(k−1) = A(k)W (k)D(k−1), with identity in the final layer: A(m) = 1.
3.2 Pedestrian simulation
Among the many RL tasks, a particularly challenging safety-critical task is collision avoidance
for a robotic vehicle among pedestrians. Because learning a policy in the real world is dangerous
and time consuming, this work uses a kinematic simulation environment for learning pedestrian
avoidance policies. The decision process of an RL agent in the environment can be described as
Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP) with the tuple < S,A, T,R,Ω, O, γ >.
The environment state S is fully described by the behavior policy, position, velocity, radius, and goal
position of each agent. In this example, the RL policy controls one of two agents with 11 discrete
action heading actions A = [amin, amax] = [−pi/6,+pi/6] and constant velocity v = 1m/s. The
environment executes the selected action under unicycle kinematics, and controls the other agent
from a diverse set of fixed policies (static, non-cooperative, ORCA [45], GA3C-CADRL [3]). The
sparse reward is 1 for reaching the goal, −0.25 for colliding and the partial observation is the x-y
position, x-y velocity, and radius of each agent, and the RL agent’s goal, as in [3].
4 Approach
This work develops an add-on certified defense for existing Deep RL algorithms to ensure robustness
against sensor noise or adversarial examples during test time.
4.1 System architecture
Figure 2 depicts the system architecture of a standard model-free RL framework with the added-on
certification. In an offline training phase, an agent uses a deep RL algorithm, here DQN [46], to
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train a DNN that maps non-corrupted state observations, s, to state-action values, Q(s, a). Action
selection during training uses the nominal cost function, a∗nom = argmaxaQ(s, a). We assume the
training process causes the network to converge to the optimal value function, Q∗(s, a) and focus
on the challenge of handling perturbed observations during execution.
During online execution, the agent only receives corrupted state observations from the environment,
and passes those through the DNN. The certification node uses the DNN architecture and weights,
W , to compute lower bounds on Q under a bounded perturbation of the input s± , which are used
for robust action selection during execution (described below).
4.2 Optimal cost function under worst-case perturbation
We consider robustness to an adversary who picks the worst-possible state observation, sadv , within
a small perturbation, , of the true state, s0. The adversary assumes the RL agent follows a nominal
policy (as in e.g., DQN) of selecting the action with highest Q-value at the current observation. A
worst possible state observation, sadv , is therefore any one which causes the RL agent to take the
action with lowest Q-value in the true state s0,
sadv ∈ {s : s ∈ Bp(s0, ) and argmax
a
Q(s, a) = argmin
a
Q(s0, a)} (4)
After the adversary picks the state observation, the agent selects an action. Instead of trusting the
observation (and thus choosing the worst action for the true state), the agent leverages the fact that
the true state s0 could be anywhere inside an -Ball around sadv: s0 ∈ Bp(sadv, ). The agent
evaluates each action by calculating the worst-case Q-value under all the possible true states. The
optimal action, a∗, is defined here as one with the highest Q-value under the worst-case perturbation,
a∗ = argmax
aj
min
s∈Bp(sadv,)
Ql(s, aj) = argmax
aj
QL(sadv, aj), (5)
using the outcome of the certification process, QL, as defined in Eq. (1).
4.3 Adapting robustness certification to deep RL
To solve Eq. (5) when Q(s, a) is represented by a DNN, we adapt the formulation from [27]. Most
works in adversarial examples, including [27], focus on defending adversaries on image inputs,
in which all channels have the same scale, e.g. black/white images with intensities in [0, 255].
More generally, however, input channels could be on different scales, e.g. joint torques, velocities,
positions. Although not often mentioned, these sensor readings can also be prone to adversarial
attacks, if transmitted over an insecure messaging framework, e.g. ROS, or accidentally producing
adversaries through sensor failure or noise. Hence, this work extends [27] to certify robustness of
variable scale inputs and enables the usage to the broader robotics and machine learning community.
To do so, we compute the lower bound QL(sadv, aj) for all states inside the -Ball Bp(sadv, )
around sadv similar to [27], but with vector  (instead of scalar ):
QL(sadv, aj) = min
s∈Bp(sadv,)
(
A
(0)
j,: s+ b
(m)
j +
m−1∑
k=1
A
(k)
j,: (b
(k) −H(k):,j )
)
(6)
=
(
min
s∈Bp(sadv,)
A
(0)
j,: s
)
+ b
(m)
j +
m−1∑
k=1
A
(k)
j,: (b
(k) −H(k):,j ) (7)
=
(
min
y∈Bp(0,1)
A
(0)
j,: (y ◦ )
)
+A
(0)
j,: sadv + b
(m)
j +
m−1∑
k=1
A
(k)
j,: (b
(k) −H(k):,j ) (8)
=
(
min
y∈Bp(0,1)
( ◦A(0)j,: )y
)
+A
(0)
j,: sadv + b
(m)
j +
m−1∑
k=1
A
(k)
j,: (b
(k) −H(k):,j ) (9)
= −|| ◦A(0)j,: ||q +A(0)j,: sadv + b(m)j +
m−1∑
k=1
A
(k)
j,: (b
(k) −H(k):,j ), (10)
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with ◦ denoting element-wise multiplication. From Eq. (7) to Eq. (8), substitute s := y ◦ + sadv ,
to shift and re-scale the observation to within the unit ball around zero, y ∈ Bp(0, 1). The
maximization in Eq. (9) reduces to a q-norm in Eq. (10) by the definition of the dual norm
||z||∗ = {supzT y : ||y|| ≤ 1} and the fact the lq norm is dual of lp norm for p, q ∈ [1,∞)
(with 1/p+ 1/q = 1). The closed form in Eq. (10) is inserted into Eq. (5) to return the best action.
5 Experimental Results
The robustness against adversaries and noise during execution is evaluated in simulations for colli-
sion avoidance among pedestrians and the cartpole domain. In both domains, increasing magnitudes
of noise or adversarial attacks are added onto the observations, which reduces the reward of an agent
following a nominal non-robust DQN policy. The added-on defense with robustness parameter, ,
increases the robustness of the policy to the introduced perturbations and increases the performance.
5.1 Adversarially robust collision avoidance
A nominal DQN policy was trained in the environment described in Section 3.2. To evaluate the
learned policy’s robustness to deviations of the input in an -ball, Bp(s0, ), around the true state,
s0, the observations of the environment agent’s position are deviated by an added uniform noise
∼U([−σ, σ]), or adversarial attack during testing. The adversarial attack is a fast gradient sign
method with target (FGST) [7] and approximates the adversary from Eq. (4). FGST crafts the
state sˆadv on the -Ball’s perimeter that maximizes the Q-value for the nominally worst action
argminaQ(s0, a). Specifically, sˆadv is picked along the direction of lowest softmax-cross-entropy
loss, L, in between a one-hot encoding yadv of the worst action and the nominal Q-values, ynom:
sˆadv = s0 − adv sign(∇sL(yadv, ynom))
yadv = [1{ai = argminaQ(s0, a)}] ∈ R|A|
ynom = [Q(s0, ai)] ∈ R|A|
As expected, the nominal DQN policy, =0, is not robust to the perturbation of inputs: Increasing the
magnitude of adversarial, or noisy perturbation, adv, σ drastically 1) increases the average number
of collisions (as seen in Figs. 3a and 3c, respectively, at =0) and 2) decreases the average reward
(as seen in Figs. 3b and 3d). The number of collisions and the reward are reported per run and
have been averaged over 5x100 episodes in the stochastic environment. Every set of 500 episodes
constitutes one data point, ∗, and has been initialized with the same 5 random seeds.
Next, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed add-on defense, called Certified
Adversarially-Robust Reinforcement Learning (CARRL). The number of collisions decreases with
an increasing robustness parameter  under varying magnitudes of noise, or adversarial attack, as
seen in Figs. 3a and 3c. As a result, the reward increases with an increasing robustness parameter
<∼0.1 under varying magnitudes of perturbations, as seen in Figs. 3a and 3c. As expected, the im-
portance of the proposed defense is highest under strong perturbations, as seen in the strong slopes
of the curves adv=0.23m and σ=0.55m. Interestingly, the CARRL policy only marginally reduces
the reward under no perturbations, σ=0, adv=0.
Since the CARRL agent selects actions more conservatively than a nominal DQN agent, it is able
successfully reach its goal instead of colliding like the nominal DQN agent does under noisy or
adversarial perturbations. Interestingly, the reward drops significantly for >∼0.1, because the agent
“runs away” from the obstacle and never reaches the goal, also seen in Fig. 6f. This is likely due to
the relatively small exploration of the full state space while training the Q-network. >0.1 yields an
-ball around sadv that is too large and contains states that are far from the training data, causing our
learned Q-function to be inaccurate, which breaks CARRL’s assumption of a perfectly learned Q-
function for  > ∼0.1. However, even with a perfectly learned Q-function, the agent could run away
or stop, when all possible actions could lead to a collision, similar to the freezing robot problem [47].
Figure 4 illustrates further intuition on choosing . Figure 4a demonstrates a linear correlation in
between the attack magnitude adv and the best defending  from Fig. 3b, i.e., the  that maximizes
the reward under the given attack magnitude best = argmax∈[min,max]R(, adv). A correlation
cannot be observed under sensor noise, as seen in Fig. 4b, because an adversary chooses an input
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 3: Robustness against adversarial attacks and noise. Figures 3a and 3c shows that an increasing ro-
bustness parameter, , decreases the number of collisions in the existence of adversarial attacks, or noise with
increasing magnitude adv, σ. Figures 3b and 3d show that an increasing robustness parameter  increases the
reward for several magnitudes of adversarial attacks or noise (e.g., adv=0.17m,σ=0.28m) while  < ∼ 0.2.
(a) (b)
Figure 4: Correlation between perturbation magnitude and  robustness. Figure 4a shows that the magnitude
of the adversarial attack, adv , is linearly correlated with the best robustness,  (i.e., one that maximizes the
reward under a given attack magnitude). Figure 4b shows that this correlation does not exist when defending
against noise. A possible explanation is that an adversary chooses an input state on the perimeter of the -ball,
whereas uniform noise samples from inside the -ball.
state on the perimeter of the -ball, whereas uniform noise samples from inside the -ball. The
p=∞-norm has been chosen for robustness against uniform noise and the FGST attack, as position
observations could be anywhere within a 2-D box around the true state. The modularity in  allows
CARRL to capture uncertainties of varying scales in the input space, e.g.,  is here non-zero for
position and zero for other inputs, but could additionally be set non-zero for velocities.  can further
be adapted on-line to account for, e.g., time-varying sensor noise.
The CARRL policy is able run at real-time; querying the policy took∼20ms. One forward pass with
certified bounds took ∼2ms, which compares to a forward pass of our nominal DQN of ∼1ms. In
our implementation, we inefficiently query the network once for each of the 11 actions. The runtime
could be reduced by parallelizing the action queries and should remain low for larger networks, as
[27] shows that the runtime scales linearly with the network size.
Visualization of the CARRL policy in particular scenarios offers additional intuition on the resulting
policy. In Fig. 5, an agent (orange) with radius .5m (circle) observes a dynamic obstacle (blue)
with added uniform noise σ=.4m (not illustrated) on the position observation. The nominal DQN
agent, in Fig. 5a is not robust to the noise and collides with the obstacle. The CARRL policy,
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(a) (b)
Figure 5: DQN vs. CARRL. An agent (orange) tries to switch positions with a dynamic, non-cooperative
obstacle (blue), while position observations are distorted with uniform noise within ±0.4m (each agent has
radius 0.5m). The nominal DQN policy, in Fig. 5a, fails to avoid the obstacle due to the added noise. The
CARRL policy (=0.1), in Fig. 5b, repeatedly considers the worst-case true obstacle state in its action selection,
and successfully reaches the goal while avoiding a collision that would end the episode.
(a)  = 0.0 (b)  = 0.1 (c)  = 0.2 (d)  = 0.3 (e)  = 0.4 (f)  = 1.0
Figure 6: Increase of conservatism with . An agent (orange) following the CARRL policy avoids a dynamic,
non-cooperative obstacle (blue) that is observed without noise. An increasing robustness parameter  (left to
right) increases the agent’s conservatism, i.e., the agent avoids the obstacle with a greater safety distance.
in Fig. 5b, however, is robust to the small perturbation in the input space and successfully avoids
the dynamic obstacle. The resulting trajectories for several  values are shown in Fig. 6, for the
same uniform noise addition. With increasing  (toward right), the CARRL agent accounts for
increasingly large worst-case position perturbations. Accordingly, the agent avoids the obstacle
increasingly conservatively, i.e., selects actions that leave more safety distance from the obstacle.
The non-dueling DQN used 2, 64-unit layers with hyperparameters: learning rate 2.05e−4, -greedy
exploration frac. 0.497, final -greedy 0.054852, buffer size 152e3, 4e5 training steps, and target
network update frequency, 10e3. The hyperparameters were found by running 100 iterations of
Bayesian optimization with Gaussian Processes [48] on the maximization of the training reward.
5.2 Generalization to the cartpole domain
Experiments in cartpole [49] show that the increased robustness to noise can generalize to another
domain. The reward is the time that a pole is successfully balanced (capped at 200 steps). The
reward of a nominal DQN drops from 199 to 141 under uniform noise with σ=.25 added to all
observations. CARRL, however, considers the worst-case state, i.e., a state in which the pole is the
closest to falling, resulting in a policy that recovers a reward of 180 with =.05, under the same noise
conditions. Hyperparameters for a 2-layer, 4-unit network were found via Bayesian Optimization.
6 Conclusion
This work adapted deep RL algorithms for application in safety-critical domains, by proposing an
add-on certified defense to address existing failures under adversarially perturbed observations and
sensor noise. The proposed extension of robustness certification tools from computer vision into a
deep RL formulation enabled efficient calculation of a lower bound on Q-values, given the obser-
vation uncertainty. These guaranteed lower bounds were used to modify the action selection rule
to provide maximum performance under worst-case observation perturbations. The resulting pol-
icy (added onto trained DQN networks) was shown to improve robustness to adversaries and sensor
noise, causing fewer collisions in a collision avoidance domain and higher reward in cartpole. Future
work will extend the guarantees to continuous action spaces and experiment with robotic hardware.
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